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Abstract
This paper considers linear quadratic (LQ) mean field games with a major player and analyzes an asymptotic solvability problem. It starts
with a large-scale system of coupled dynamic programming equations and applies a re-scaling technique introduced in Huang and Zhou
(2018a, 2018b) to derive a set of Riccati equations in lower dimensions, the solvability of which determines the necessary and sufficient
condition for asymptotic solvability. We next derive the mean field limit of the strategies and the value functions. Finally, we show that
the two decentralized strategies can be interpreted as the best responses of a major player and a representative minor player embedded in
an infinite population, which have the property of consistent mean field approximations.
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1 Introduction
Mean field game theory has undergone a phenomenal
growth. It provides a powerful methodology for handling
complexity in noncooperative mean field decision problems.
The readers are referred to (Caines, Huang, and Malhame´,
2017) for an overview. Most existing analysis has been de-
veloped based on two routes called the direct approach and
the fixed point approach. By the direct approach, one starts
by formally solving an N-player game to obtain a large
coupled solution equation system, and next derives a simple
limiting equation system by taking N → ∞; see (Lasry and
Lions, 2007) for the limit consisting of a Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation and a Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov
(FPK) equation. By the fixed point approach, one deter-
mines the best response of a representative agent to a mean
field of an infinite population, and next all the agents’ best
responses should regenerate that mean field (Huang, Mal-
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hame´, and Caines, 2006). This procedure formalizes a fixed
point problem, which can be solved and further used to de-
sign decentralized strategies. For LQ mean field games, the
recent work (Huang and Zhou, 2018b) shows the exact re-
lationship of the two approaches. In general, the fixed point
approach has more flexibilities and can be implemented in
diverse models (Huang, Caines, and Malhame´, 2007; Li and
Zhang, 2008; Bensoussan et al, 2013; Huang and Ma, 2016;
Carmona and Delarue, 2018). Further convergence analy-
sis in the direct approach can be found in (Cardaliaguet et
al, 2015; Lacker, 2016; Fischer, 2017). Mean field games
have found applications in traffic routing (Bauso, Zhang,
and Papachristodoulou, 2017), smart grids (Couillet, et al,
2012; Ma, Callaway, and Hiskens, 2013; Kizilkale, Salhab,
and Malhame´, 2019) and production planning (Wang and
Huang, 2019), among others. A notable feature of the early
literature of mean field games is that all players in the
model are comparably small, and can be called peers.
Huang (2010) introduces an LQ mean field game model
with a major player which has strong influence. A motivat-
ing example is the interaction between a large corporation
and many much smaller firms. There has been a rapid in-
crease of literature on mean field games with a major and
many minor players. In the setting of LQ models, Nguyen
and Huang (2012a) consider continuum parametrized mi-
nor players, and Nguyen and Huang (2012b) extend to mass
behavior directly impacted by the major player. Kordonis
and Papavassilopoulos (2015) analyze minor players with
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random entrance. Major players with leadership are studied
by Bensoussan et al (2017), Moon and Basar (2018). Par-
tial state observation is considered by Caines and Kizilkale
(2017), Firoozi and Caines (2015). Huang, Wang and Wu
(2016) take linear backward stochastic differential equations
to model the dynamics of the players. Huang, Jaimungal, and
Nourian (2015) present an application of the major player
mean field game theory to an optimal execution model with
an institutional trader and a large number of small traders.
Major-minor player games with nonlinear diffusion dynam-
ics are an important class of modelling; see Nourian and
Caines (2013), Buckdahn, Li and Peng (2014), Bensoussan,
Chau and Yam (2016), Carmona and Zhu (2016). Leader-
follower interaction is adopted by Bensoussan et al (2015),
Fu and Horst (2018). To deal with this nonlinear modelling,
forward-backward stochastic differential equations provide
a vital analytical tool. Sen and Caines (2016) apply nonlin-
ear filtering when the major player’s state is partially ob-
served. More recently, Lasry and Lions (2018) introduce
master equations for mean field games with major and minor
players. They may be viewed as a pair of abstract dynamic
programming equations. Cardadiaguet, Cirant, and Porretta
(2018) prove the convergence of the Nash equilibria by use
of the master equations when the number of minor players
tends to infinity. A mean field principal-agent model is for-
mulated by Elie, Mastrolia, and Possamai (2019). For major
player models with discrete states, see (Huang 2012; Car-
mona and Wang, 2017; Kolokoltsov, 2017).
Huang (2010) applies a state space augmentation approach
by adding the mean field dynamics into the two decision
problems, one for the major player and one for a representa-
tive minor player. This Markovianizes the problem and en-
ables the use of dynamic programming. The procedure of
Huang (2010) is based on the fixed point approach and the
associated consistent mean field approximations, and that
work only assumes existence of the solution.
This paper analyzes the LQ mean field game with a ma-
jor player and homogeneous (or symmetric) minor players
and takes the direct approach by starting with the solution
for N+ 1 players. Specifically, we will extend an asymp-
totic solvability notion introduced in a recent work Huang
and Zhou (2018a) for LQ mean field games without a major
player. With or without a major player, asymptotic solvabil-
ity can be informally stated as the existence of Nash equilib-
ria with complete state information for all sufficiently large
population sizes, in addition to some boundedness property
of the solution. We exploit the multi-scale nature of the opti-
mization problem and use a re-scaling method in Huang and
Zhou (2018a, 2018b) so that the key information in some
higher order terms, as components in the solution matrices
of N + 1 coupled Riccati equations, can be captured. We
derive the necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic
solvability and evaluate the value function. The re-scaling
method gives a set of ordinary differential equations (ODEs)
for nine matrix functions. To reveal the special structure un-
derlying these functions, we will further relate them to the
best responses of the major player and a representativeminor
player staying an infinite population, where consistent mean
field approximations hold. The latter is a key feature of the
fixed point approach in mean field games. Our mean field
limit analysis shares similarity to (Cardadiaguet, Cirant, and
Porretta, 2018) which performs convergence analysis in a
nonlinear system via the master equation. But we explicitly
exploit the multi-scale phenomena in our model to identify
a lower dimensional object which governs the asymptotic
behavior of the system when the number of minor players
tends to infinity. Similar methods appear in the statistical
physics literature on mean field models (Ott and Antonsen,
2008; Pazo and Montbrio, 2014).
We mention other related LQ models of finding mean field
limits via analyzing large scale equations. Papavassilopoulos
(2014) uses large algebraic Riccati equations in mean field
games and analyzes existence by an implicit function the-
orem. Priuli (2015) considers coupled HJB and FPK equa-
tions with decentralized information. Mean field social op-
timal control is analyzed in (Huang 2003, Chap. 6; Herty,
Pareschi, and Steffensen, 2015) via large Riccati equations.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the LQ Nash game with N+1 players together with
its solution via dynamic programming and Riccati equations.
Section 3 extends the formulation of asymptotic solvability
in Huang and Zhou (2018a, 2018b) to the LQ model with
a major player. Section 4 presents further mean field lim-
its and the performance. Section 5 formulates two optimal
control problems under a mean field generated by an infi-
nite number of minor players and addresses the relation to
the asymptotic solvability problem. Numerical examples are
presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Notation: For symmetric matrix S≥ 0, we may write xTSx=
|x|2S. For a matrix Z = (z jk) ∈ Rl×m, denote the l1-norm‖Z‖l1 = ∑ j,k |z jk|. Let the function g(δ ,x) be defined for x
in a subset Dg of a Euclidean space and parameter δ ∈ (0, p]
for some p> 0. We say g is compactly of O(δ ) if for each
compact subset D0 ⊂Dg, there exists a constant c0 depend-
ing on D0 such that supx∈D0 |g(δ ,x)| ≤ c0δ .
2 The LQ game with major and minor players
We consider the LQ game with a major player A0 and N
minor players Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N. At time t ≥ 0, the states of
A0 and Ai are, respectively, denoted by X0(t) and Xi(t),
1≤ i≤ N. The dynamics of the N+ 1 players are given by
a system of linear stochastic differential equations (SDEs):
dX0(t) =
(
A0X0(t)+B0u0(t)+F0X
(N)(t)
)
dt
+D0dW0(t), (1)
dXi(t) =
(
AXi(t)+Bui(t)+FX
(N)(t)+GX0(t)
)
dt
+DdWi(t), 1≤ i≤ N, t ≥ 0, (2)
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where we have state Xi ∈ Rn, control ui ∈ Rn1 , and X (N) =
1
N ∑
N
k=1Xk(t). The initial states {X j(0),0≤ j ≤N} are inde-
pendent with EX j(0) = x j(0) and finite second moment. The
N+ 1 standard n2-dimensional Brownian motions {Wj,0 ≤
j ≤ N} are independent and also independent of the ini-
tial states. The deterministic constant matrices A0, A, B0,
B, D0, D, F0, F , G have compatible dimensions. Denote
u = (u0, · · · ,uN). The costs of players Ak, 0 ≤ k ≤ N, are
given by
J0(u) = E
∫ T
0
[
|X0(t)−Γ0X (N)(t)−η0|2Q0 + |u0(t)|2R0
]
dt
+E|X0(T )−Γ0 fX (N)(T )−η0 f |2Q0 f , (3)
Ji(u) = E
∫ T
0
[
|Xi(t)−Γ1X0(t)−Γ2X (N)(t)−η |2Q+ |ui(t)|2R
]
dt
+E|Xi(T )−Γ1 fX0(T )−Γ2 fX (N)(T )−η f |2Q f , (4)
1≤ i≤ N.
The deterministic constant matrices (or vectors) Q0, Γ0, η0,
R0, Q0 f , Γ0 f , η0 f , Q, Γ1, Γ2, η , R, Q f , Γ1 f , Γ2 f , η f above
have compatible dimensions, and Q0 ≥ 0, Q0 f ≥ 0, Q ≥ 0,
Q f ≥ 0, R0 > 0, R > 0. For notational simplicity, we only
consider constant parameters. Our analysis can be easily
extended to the case of time-dependent parameters. Define
x= (xT0 ,x
T
1 , · · · ,xTN)T ∈R(N+1)n,
X(t) =

X0(t)
...
XN(t)
 ∈ R(N+1)n, W (t) =

W0(t)
...
WN(t)
 ∈ R(N+1)n2 ,
Â= diag[A0,A, · · · ,A]+
[
0, 11×n⊗ F0N
1n×1⊗G, 1n×n⊗ FN
]
,
D̂ = diag[D0,D, · · · ,D] ∈ R(N+1)n×(N+1)n2 ,
B0 = e
N+1
1 ⊗B0 ∈R(N+1)n×n1 ,
Bk = e
N+1
k+1 ⊗B ∈ R(N+1)n×n1 , 1≤ k≤ N.
We denote by 1k×l a k× l matrix with all entries equal to 1,
and by the column vectors {ek1, . . . ,ekk} the canonical basis of
Rk. For instance, ek1 = [1,0, · · · ,0]T ∈Rk. For matrices K =
(ki j) ∈ Rl1×l2 , Kˆ ∈ Rl3×l4 , the Kronecker product K⊗ Kˆ =
(ki jKˆ)1≤i≤l1,1≤ j≤l2 ∈R(l1l3)×(l2l4). We may use a subscript n
to indicate the identity matrix In to be n× n.
Now we write (1) and (2) in the form
dX(s) =
(
ÂX(s)+
N
∑
k=0
Bkuk(s)
)
dt+ D̂dW (s), (5)
where s≥ 0. We consider closed-loop perfect state (CLPS)
information so that X(s) is observed by each player, and
look for Nash strategies in this section. Let u−k denote the
strategies of all players other than Ak. A set of strategies
(uˆ0, · · · , uˆN) is a Nash equilibrium if for any 0≤ k ≤ N, we
have
Jk(uˆk, uˆ−k)≤ Jk(uk, uˆ−k),
for any state feedback based strategy uk which together with
uˆ−k ensures a unique solution of X(s) on [0,T ]. Denote the
value function of A j by V j(t,x), 0 ≤ j ≤ N, which corre-
sponds to the initial time-state pair (t,x) in (5), i.e., X(t)=x
at the initial time t, and can be interpreted as J j evaluated
on the time interval [t,T ] under the set of Nash strategies.
The set of value functions is determined by the system of
HJB equations
0=
∂V0
∂ t
+ min
u0∈Rn1
(∂TV0
∂x
(
Âx+
N
∑
k=0
Bkuk
)
+ uT0R0u0
+ |x0−Γ0x(N)−η0|2Q0 +
1
2
Tr
(
D̂T (V0)xxD̂
))
, (6)
V0(T,x) = |x0−Γ0 fx(N)−η0 f |2Q0 f ,
and
0=
∂Vi
∂ t
+ min
ui∈Rn1
(∂TVi
∂x
(
Âx+
N
∑
k=0
Bkuk
)
+ uTi Rui
+ |xi−Γ1x0−Γ2x(N)−η |2Q+
1
2
Tr
(
D̂T (Vi)xxD̂
))
,
(7)
Vi(T,x) = |xi−Γ1 fx0−Γ2 fx(N)−η f |2Q f , 1≤ i≤ N,
where x(N) = (1/N)∑Ni=1xi and the minimizers are
u0 =−1
2
R−10 B
T
0
∂V0
∂x
, (8)
ui =−1
2
R−1BTi
∂Vi
∂x
, 1≤ i≤ N. (9)
Next we substitute u0 and ui into (6) and (7):
0=
∂V0
∂ t
+
∂TV0
∂x
(
Âx− 1
2
B0R
−1
0 B
T
0
∂V0
∂x
− 1
2
N
∑
k=1
BkR
−1BTk
∂Vk
∂x
)
+ |x0−Γ0x(N)−η0|2Q0
+
1
4
∂TV0
∂x
B0R
−1
0 B
T
0
∂V0
∂x
+
1
2
Tr
(
D̂T (V0)xxD̂
)
, (10)
and
0=
∂Vi
∂ t
+
∂TVi
∂x
(
Âx− 1
2
B0R
−1
0 B
T
0
∂V0
∂x
− 1
2
N
∑
k=1
BkR
−1BTk
∂Vk
∂x
)
+ |xi−Γ1x0−Γ2x(N)−η |2Q
+
1
4
∂TVi
∂x
BiR
−1BTi
∂Vi
∂x
+
1
2
Tr
(
D̂T (Vi)xxD̂
)
, 1≤ i≤ N. (11)
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Suppose V j(t,x), 0≤ j ≤ N, has the following form
V j(t,x) = x
TP j(t)x+ 2S
T
j (t)x+r j(t), (12)
where P j(t) is symmetric. Then
∂V j
∂x
= 2P j(t)x+ 2S j(t),
∂ 2V j
∂x2
= 2P j(t). (13)
Denote
K0 = [In,0, · · · ,0]− 1N [0,Γ0, · · · ,Γ0],
Q0 =K
T
0 Q0K0,
Ki = [0,0, · · · , In,0, · · · ,0]− [Γ1,0, · · · ,0]
− 1
N
[0,Γ2, · · · ,Γ2], (14)
Qi =K
T
i QKi,
where In is the (i+1)th submatrix in (14). We haveK0,Ki ∈
Rn×(N+1)n and Q0,Qi ∈R(N+1)n×(N+1)n. We write
|x0−Γ0x(N)−η0|2Q0 = xTQ0x− 2xTKT0 Q0η0
+ηT0 Q0η0, (15)
|xi−Γ1x0−Γ2x(N)−η |2Q = xTQix− 2xTKTi Qη
+ηTQη , 1≤ i≤ N. (16)
We may write V j(T,x), 0≤ j ≤ N, in a similar form.
We substitute (13) into (10) and derive the equation systems:

P˙0(t) =−
(
P0Â+ Â
TP0
)
+P0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P0
+
(
P0 ∑
N
k=1BkR
−1BTk Pk
+∑Nk=1PkBkR
−1BTk P0
)
−Q0,
P0(T ) =Q0 f ,
(17)

S˙0(t) =−ÂTS0+P0B0R−10 BT0 S0
+∑Nk=1PkBkR
−1BTk S0
+P0 ∑
N
k=1BkR
−1BTk Sk+K
T
0 Q0η0,
S0(T ) =−KT0 fQ0 fη0 f ,
(18)

r˙0(t) = S
T
0 B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 S0+ 2S
T
0 ∑
N
k=1BkR
−1BTk Sk
−ηT0 Q0η0−Tr
(
D̂TP0D̂
)
,
r0(T ) = η
T
0 fQ0 fη0 f .
(19)
By (11) and (13), we derive the equation systems:

P˙i(t) =−
(
PiÂ+ Â
TPi
)−PiBiR−1BTi Pi
+
(
PiB0R
−1
0 B
T
0 P0+P0B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 Pi
)
+
(
Pi ∑
N
k=1BkR
−1BTk Pk+
∑Nk=1PkBkR
−1BTk Pi
)
−Qi
Pi(T ) =Qi f , 1≤ i≤ N,
(20)

S˙i(t) =−ÂTSi+P0B0R−10 B0TSi
+PiB0R
−1
0 B
T
0 S0−PiBiR−1BTi Si
+∑Nk=1PkBkR
−1BTk Si
+Pi∑
N
k=1BkR
−1BTk Sk+K
T
i Qη ,
Si(T ) =−KTi fQ f η f , 1≤ i≤ N,
(21)

r˙i(t) = 2S
T
i B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 S0
+2Si
T ∑Nk=1BkR
−1BTk Sk
−STi BiR−1BTi Si−ηTQη −Tr
(
D̂TPiD̂
)
,
ri(T ) = η
T
f Q f η f , 1≤ i≤ N.
(22)
Remark 1 If (17) and (20) have a solution (P0, · · · ,PN)
on [τ,T ]⊆ [0,T ], such a solution is unique due to the local
Lipschitz continuity of the vector field; see (Hale, 1969). The
ODE guarantees each P j, 0 ≤ j ≤ N, to be symmetric. If
(17) and (20) have a unique solution (P0, · · · ,PN) on [0,T ],
then we can uniquely solve (S0, · · · ,SN) and (r0, · · · ,rN).
Lemma 1 Suppose that (17) and (20) have a unique so-
lution (P0, · · · ,PN) on [0,T ]. Then we can uniquely solve
(18), (19), (21), (22), and the Nash game of N+ 1 players
has a set of feedback Nash strategies given by
uˆ0(t) =−R−10 BT0 (P0X(t)+S0), (23)
uˆi(t) =−R−1BTi (PiX(t)+Si), 1≤ i≤ N. (24)
Proof. This lemma follows the standard results in (Basar
and Olsder, 1999, Theorem 6.16, Corollary 6.5). ✷
By Lemma 1 and Remark 1, the solution of the feedback
Nash strategies completely reduces to the study of (17) and
(20).
4
3 Asymptotic solvability
Define the (N+ 1)n× (N+ 1)n identity matrix
I(N+1)n =

In 0 · · · 0
0 In · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · In
 .
For 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ N+ 1, exchanging the ith and jth rows of
submatrices in I(N+1)n, let Ji j denote the resulting matrix.
For instance, we have
J12 =

0 In · · · 0
In 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · In
 .
It is easy to check that JTi j = J
−1
i j = Ji j.
Theorem 2 P0(t) and P1(t) have the representation:
P0(t) =

Π 01 Π
0
2 Π
0
2 · · · Π 02
Π 02
T
Π 03 Π
0
3 · · · Π 03
Π 02
T
Π 03 Π
0
3 · · · Π 03
...
...
...
. . .
...
Π 02
T
Π 03 Π
0
3 · · · Π 03

, (25)
and
P1(t) =

Π0 Πa Πb · · · Πb
ΠTa Π1 Π2 · · · Π2
ΠTb Π
T
2 Π3 · · · Π3
...
...
...
. . .
...
ΠTb Π
T
2 Π3 · · · Π3

, (26)
where each submatrix depends on t and is n×n. Moreover,
Pi(t) = J
T
2,i+1P1(t)J2,i+1 for i≥ 2.
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
Definition 3 The sequence of Nash games (1)-(4) has
asymptotic solvability if there exists N0 such that for all
N ≥ N0, (P0, · · · ,PN) has a solution on [0,T ] and
sup
N≥N0,0≤t≤T
(
‖P0(t)‖l1 + ‖P1(t)‖l1
)
< ∞. (27)
✷
Note that (27) is equivalent to
sup
N≥N0,0≤t≤T
[|Π 01 (t)|+N|Π 02 (t)|+N2|Π 03 (t)|]< ∞, (28)
sup
N≥N0,0≤t≤T
[|Π0(t)|+ |Π1(t)|+ |Πa(t)|+N|Πb(t)|
+N|Π2(t)|+N2|Π3(t)|
]
< ∞. (29)
Denote
M0 = B0R
−1
0 B
T
0 , M = BR
−1BT .
Define
Λ0N1 = Π
0
1 , Λ
0N
2 = NΠ
0
2 , Λ
0N
3 = N
2Π 03 ,
ΛN0 = Π0, Λ
N
1 = Π1, Λ
N
2 = NΠ2,
ΛN3 = N
2Π3, Λ
N
a = Πa, Λ
N
b = NΠb.
(30)
For (17) and (20) we write the ODE system for the set of
variables (Λ0N1 ,Λ
0N
2 , . . . ,Λ
N
b ) in (30); see Appendix B. The
following ODE system is obtained as the limit of the above
ODE system with respect to N:
Λ˙01 = Λ
0
1M0Λ
0
1 − (Λ01A0+AT0Λ01 )
+Λ02 (MΛ
T
a −G)+ (ΛaM−GT )Λ02
T −Q0,
Λ˙02 = (Λ
0
1M0−AT0 )Λ02 +Λ02 (M(Λ1+Λ2)−A−F)
−Λ01F0+(ΛaM−GT )Λ03 +Q0Γ0,
Λ˙03 = Λ
0
2
T
M0Λ
0
2 −Λ02
T
F0−FT0 Λ02
+Λ03 (M(Λ1+Λ2)−A−F)
+((Λ1+Λ
T
2 )M−AT −FT )Λ03 −Γ T0 Q0Γ0,
Λ˙0 = ΛaMΛ
T
a −ΛbG−GTΛTb
+Λ0(M0Λ
0
1 −A0)+ (Λ01M0−AT0 )Λ0
−Λa(G−MΛTb )− (GT −ΛbM)ΛTa −Γ T1 QΓ1,
Λ˙1 = Λ1MΛ1−Λ1A−ATΛ1−Q,
Λ˙2 = Λ
T
a (M0Λ
0
2 −F0)−Λ1F+(Λ1M−AT )Λ2
+Λ2(M(Λ1+Λ2)−A−F)+QΓ2,
Λ˙3 = Λ
T
b M0Λ
0
2 +Λ
0
2
T
M0Λb+Λ
T
2 MΛ2
−ΛTb F0−FT0 Λb−ΛT2 F−FTΛ2
+Λ3(M(Λ1+Λ2)−A−F)
+((Λ1+Λ
T
2 )M−AT −FT )Λ3−Γ T2 QΓ2,
Λ˙a = (Λ
0
1M0−AT0 )Λa+Λa(MΛ1−A)
−GTΛ1+(ΛaM−GT )ΛT2 +Γ T1 Q,
Λ˙b = Λ0M0Λ
0
2 +(ΛaM−GT )(Λ2+Λ3)−Λ0F0
−ΛaF+Λb(M(Λ1+Λ2)−A−F)
+(Λ01M0−AT0 )Λb−Γ T1 QΓ2,
(31)
5
where the terminal conditions are

Λ01 (T ) = Q0 f , Λ
0
2 (T ) =−Q0 fΓ0 f ,
Λ03 (T ) = Γ
T
0 fQ0 fΓ0 f ,
Λ0(T ) = Γ
T
1 fQ fΓ1 f , Λ1(T ) = Q f ,
Λ2(T ) =−Q fΓ2 f , Λ3(T ) = Γ T2 fQ fΓ2 f ,
Λa(T ) =−Γ T1 fQ f , Λb(T ) = Γ T1 fQ fΓ2 f .
Theorem 4 The sequence of games in (1)-(4) has asymp-
totic solvability if and only if (31) has a solution on [0,T ].
Proof. See Appendix B. ✷
Due to the quadratic terms in its right hand sides, we call (31)
a system of Riccati ODEs. As it turns out later in Section
5, this set of solution functions can be interpreted according
to two optimal control problems.
4 Equilibrium costs and decentralized control
For this section, we assume (31) has a solution on [0,T ].
Therefore there exists N0 > 0 such that for all N ≥ N0, (17)
and (20) have a solution (P0, · · · ,PN) on [0,T ].
Proposition 5 Let (S0, · · · ,SN) be the solution of (18) and
(21). We have the representation
S0(t) = [θ
0
0
T
,θ 01
T
, · · · ,θ 01
T
]T ,
Si(t) = [θ
T
0 ,θ
T
2 , · · · ,θT2 ,θT1 ,θT2 , · · · ,θT2 ]T , 1≤ i≤ N,
where each vector of θ 00 (t), θ
0
1 (t), θ0(t), θ1(t), θ2(t) is in
Rn and θT1 is the (i+ 1)th component of Si.
Proof. The method is similar to proving Theorem 2, and
we omit the detail. ✷
Define
α0N0 = θ
0
0 , α
0N
1 = Nθ
0
1 ,
αN0 = θ0, α
N
1 = θ1, α
N
2 = Nθ2.
We derive a set of ODEs for (α0N0 ,α
0N
1 ,α
N
0 ,α
N
1 ,α
N
2 ); see
Appendix C. By taking the limit form of these equations
with respect to N, we introduce the ODE system:
α˙00 = (Λ
0
1M0−AT0 )α00 +(ΛaM−GT )α01
+Λ02Mα1+Q0η0,
α˙01 = (Λ
0
2
T
M0−FT0 )α00 +(Λ1M+ΛT2 M−AT −FT )α01
+Λ03Mα1−Γ T0 Q0η0,
α˙0 = (Λ
0
1M0−AT0 )α0+((Λa+Λb)M−GT )α1
+Λ0M0α
0
0 +(ΛaM−GT )α2−Γ T1 Qη ,
α˙1 = ((Λ1+Λ2)M−AT )α1+ΛTa M0α00 +Qη ,
α˙2 = (Λ
0
2
T
M0−FT0 )α0+((Λ1+ΛT2 )M−AT −FT )α2
+ΛTb M0α
0
0 +((Λ
T
2 +Λ3)M−FT )α1−Γ T2 Qη ,
where
α00 (T ) =−Q0 fη0 f , α01 (T ) = Γ T0 fQ0 fη0 f ,
α0(T ) = Γ
T
1 fQ fη f , α1(T ) =−Q fη f ,
α2(T ) = Γ
T
2 fQ fη f .
After (31) is solved, (α00 , · · · ,α2) satisfies a linear ODE
system and can be uniquely solved on [0,T ].
Proposition 6 We have
sup
0≤t≤T
{|θ 00 (t)−α00 (t)|+ |Nθ 01 (t)−α01 (t)|+ |θ0(t)−α0(t)|
+ |θ1(t)−α1(t)|+ |Nθ2(t)−α2(t)|}= O( 1N ).
Proof. We consider the first ODE system for (Λ0N1 , · · · ,ΛNb )
and (α0N0 , · · · ,αN2 ), and the second ODE system for
(Λ01 , . . . ,Λb) and (α
0
0 , · · · ,α2). By (Huang and Zhou, 2018b,
Theorem 4), we obtain the error bound. ✷
In view of (19) and (22), we obtain
r˙0 = θ
0
0
T
M0θ
0
0 + 2Nθ
0
1
T
Mθ1−ηT0 Q0η0
−Tr(DT0 Π 01D0)−Tr(NDTΠ 03D),
r˙i = 2θ
T
0 M0θ
0
0 + 2(N− 1)θT2 Mθ1+θT1 Mθ1−ηTQη
−Tr(DT0 Π0D0+DTΠ1D)− (N− 1)Tr(DTΠ3D),
where r0(T ) = η
T
0 fQ0 fη0 f and ri(T ) = η
T
f Q fη f . For N ≥
N0, we can uniquely solve r0 and ri. It is clear that ri does
not depend on i. We rewrite
r˙0 = (α
0N
0 )
TM0α
0N
0 + 2(α
0N
1 )
TMαN1 −ηT0 Q0η0
−Tr(DT0 Λ0N1 D0)− 1NTr(DTΛ0N3 D), (32)
r˙i = 2α
N
0
T
M0α
0N
0 + 2α
N
2
T
MαN1 +α
N
1
T
MαN1
−ηTQη−Tr(DT0 ΛN0 D0)−Tr(DTΛN1 D)
− 2
N
αN2
T
MαN1 − ( 1N − 1N2 )Tr(DTΛN3 D). (33)
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As the approximation of (32) and (33), we introduce the
ODE system
χ˙0 = α
0
0
T
M0α
0
0 + 2α
0
1
T
Mα1−ηT0 Q0η0−Tr(DT0 Λ01D0),
χ˙ = 2αT0 M0α
0
0 + 2α
T
2 Mα1+α
T
1 Mα1
−ηTQη −Tr(DT0 Λ0D0)−Tr(DTΛ1D),
where χ0(T ) = η
T
0 fQ0 fη0 f and χ(T ) = η
T
f Q fη f , and we
solve (χ0, χ) on [0, T ].
Proposition 7 We have
sup
0≤t≤T
{|r0(t)− χ0(t)|+ |ri(t)− χ(t)|}= O( 1N ).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 6. ✷
Assumption (H): The initial states X1(0),X2(0), · · · , are i.i.d.
and X1(0) has mean µ , and covariance Σ . In addition, X0(0)
has mean µ0 and covariance Σ0.
Denote the set of Nash strategies uˆ= (uˆ0, uˆ1, · · · , uˆN) given
by (23)-(24).
Proposition 8 Under Assumption (H), the costs under the
set of strategies uˆ have the asymptotic form
lim
N→∞
J0(uˆ) = µ
T
0 Λ
0
1 (0)µ0+ 2µ
T
0 Λ
0
2 (0)µ + µ
TΛ03 µ
+ 2(µT0 α
0
0 (0)+ µ
Tα01 (0))+Tr(Λ
0
1 (0)Σ0)+ χ0(0),
lim
N→∞
J1(uˆ) = µ
T
0 Λ0(0)µ0+ 2µ
TΛa(0)µ0+ 2µ
T
0 Λb(0)µ
+ µT (Λ1(0)+ 2Λ2(0)+Λ3(0))µ
+ 2[µT0 α0(0)+ µ
Tα1(0)+ µ
Tα2(0)]
+Tr(Λ0(0)Σ0+Λ1(0)Σ)+ χ1(0).
Proof. Note that
J0(uˆ) = E[X
T (0)P0(0)X(0)+ 2S
T
0 (0)X(0)]+r0(0),
and
XT (0)P0(0)X(0) = X
T
0 (0)Π
0
1 (0)X0(0)
+ 2XT0 (0)[Π
0
2 (0), · · · ,Π 02 (0)]X−0(0)
+XT−0(0)

Π 03 (0) · · · Π 03 (0)
...
. . .
...
Π 03 (0) · · · Π 03 (0)
X−0(0),
where X−0(0) = [XT1 (0),X
T
2 (0), · · · ,XTN (0)]T . Similarly we
have
J1(uˆ) = E[X
T (0)P1(0)X(0)+ 2S
T
1 (0)X(0)]+r1(0).
We complete the proof by elementary computations and tak-
ing limits. ✷
Substituting uˆ0 and uˆi into (1) and (2), we have
dX0 =
(
A0X0−M0(Π 01X0+NΠ 02X (N)+θ 00 )
+F0X
(N)
)
dt+D0dW0,
dX (N) =
(
AX (N)−M(ΠTa X0+Π1X (N)+(N− 1)Π2X (N)
+θ1)+FX
(N)+GX0
)
dt+
1
N
N
∑
i=1
DdWi. (34)
When N→ ∞, we obtain a limit form of the strategies
uˇ0 =−R−10 BT0 (Λ01X0+Λ02X+α00 ), (35)
uˇi =−R−1BT (ΛTa X0+Λ1Xi+Λ2X+α1), (36)
where X is the infinite population limit of the state average
X (N) of the minor players in (34). For the N+1 player game,
we replace X in the strategies (35)-(36) by X
†
and write the
closed-loop system of equations:
dX0(t) =
[
A0X0−M0(Λ01X0+Λ02X†+α00 )
+F0X
(N)
]
dt+D0dW0, (37)
dXi(t) =
[
AXi−M(ΛTa X0+Λ1Xi+Λ2X†+α1)
+FX (N)+GX0
]
dt+DdWi, 1≤ i≤ N, (38)
dX
†
(t) =[(A−M(Λ1+Λ2)+F)X†
+(G−MΛTa )X0−Mα1]dt, t ≥ 0,
where X
†
is generated by the N+ 1 players instead of an
infinite population. Denote the strategies in (37)-(38) by
(uˇ†0, · · · , uˇ†N). Following the standard mean square error es-
timate of |X (N)−X | for (37)-(38), under assumption (H) we
can show that (uˇ†0, · · · , uˇ†N) is an ε-Nash equilibrium for the
N+ 1 player game, where ε = O(1/
√
N) and each player
may use centralized state informationX(t); see related meth-
ods in (Huang, 2010).
By the re-scaling technique, we derive the mean field limits
of the costs and strategies. The feasibility condition is de-
termined by (31) directly based on the model parameters in
(1)-(4). This is different from (Huang, 2010), where the ex-
istence condition is described in an augmented state space
in 3n dimensions and imposes consistency requirements on
3n× 3n matrices.
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5 The limiting control problems and best responses
For this section, we assume (31) has a solution on [0,T ].
An interesting question is whether the above two limit strate-
gies in (35)-(36) have the interpretation as best responses in
appropriately constructed optimal control problems. Finding
the best response of a single agent in an infinite population
model has been a key step in the fixed point approach in
mean field games; see (Huang, Caines, and Malhame´, 2007;
Huang, 2010). We introduce two optimal control problems.
Problem (P0): The dynamics are given by
dX0(t) =
(
A0X0+B0u0+F0X
)
dt+DdW0, (39)
dX(t) =[(A−M(Λ1+Λ2)+F)X
+(G−MΛTa )X0−Mα1]dt, (40)
where X0(0) and X(0) = µ0 are given. Equation (40) may be
viewed as the limit of (34) but nowX0 is indirectly controlled
by u0 in (39). The cost is
J0(u0) = E
∫ T
0
(
|X0(t)−Γ0X(t)−η0|2Q0 + |u0(t)|2R0
)
dt
+E|X0(T )−Γ0 fX(T )−η0 f |2Q0 f .
Problem (P1): The dynamics are given by
dX1(t) =
(
AX1+Bu1+FX+GX0
)
dt+DdW1,
dX0(t) =[A0X0−M0(Λ01X0+Λ02X+α00 )]dt
+F0Xdt+D0dW0, (41)
dX(t) =[(A−M(Λ1+Λ2)+F)X
+(G−MΛTa )X0−Mα1]dt,
where X1(0), X0(0) and X(0) = µ0 are given. The notation
(X0,X) is reused in Problem (P1), where u0 has taken a
specific form in (41). Equation (41) can be viewed as a limit
form of (37) when N→ ∞. Since the two problems will be
solved separately, this should cause no risk of confusion.
The cost is
J1(u1) = E
∫ T
0
(
|X1(t)−Γ1X0(t)−Γ2X(t)−η |2Q+ |u1|2R
)
dt
+E|X1(T )−Γ1 fX0(T )−Γ2 fX(T )−η f |2Q f ,
SinceR0> 0, Q0, Q0, f ≥ 0, R> 0, Q, Q f ≥ 0, both Problem
(P0) and Problem (P1) can be solved. The resulting optimal
control laws will also be called best responses.
Below, we start with the solution of Problem (P0). Denote
A0 =
[
A0 F0
G−MΛTa A+F−M(Λ1+Λ2)
]
, B0 =
[
B0
0
]
,
Q0 =
[
In
−Γ T0
]
Q0[In,−Γ0].
Then we have
d
[
X0
X
]
= A0
[
X0
X
]
dt+B0u0dt−
[
0
Mα1
]
dt+
[
D0dW0
0
]
.
We further write
|X0−Γ0X−η0|2Q0
= (XT0 ,X
T
)Q0
[
X0
X
]
− 2ηT0 Q0[In,−Γ0]
[
X0
X
]
+ηT0 Q0η0.
By dynamic programming for the optimal control problem
(P0), we introduce
P˙0 =−AT0 P0−P0A0+P0B0R−10 BT0 P0−Q0, (42)
S˙0 =−AT0 S0+P0B0R−10 BT0 S0
+P0
[
0
Mα1
]
+
[
In
−Γ T0
]
Q0η0, (43)
where the terminal condition can be determined as
P0(T ) =
[
In
−Γ T0 f
]
Q0 f [In,−Γ0 f ],
S0(T ) =−
[
In
−Γ T0 f
]
Q0 fη0 f .
We uniquely solve P0 and S0 on [0,T ]. Note that P0 is a
2n× 2n matrix. The optimal control law is
u∗0(t) =−R−10 BT0 (P0[XT0 (t),X
T
(t)]T +S0).
Denote
P0 =
[
Φ01 Φ
0
2
Φ02
T
Φ03
]
, Φ0k (t) ∈ Rn×n, S0 =
[
β 00
β 01
]
,
where Φ01 and Φ
0
3 are symmetric. Then by (42), we derive
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the ODE system:
Φ˙01 = Φ
0
1M0Φ
0
1 −AT0 Φ01 −Φ01A0− (GT −ΛaM)Φ02
T
−Φ02 (G−MΛTa )−Q0,
Φ˙02 =−AT0 Φ02 − (GT −ΛaM)Φ03 −Φ01F0
−Φ02 (A+F−M(Λ1+Λ2))
+Φ01M0Φ
0
2 +Q0Γ0,
Φ˙03 = Φ
0
2
T
M0Φ
0
2 −FT0 Φ02 −Φ02
T
F0
−(AT +FT − (Λ1+ΛT2 )M)Φ03
−Φ03 (A+F−M(Λ1+Λ2))−Γ T0 Q0Γ0,
where
Φ01 (T ) = Q0 f , Φ
0
2 (T ) =−Q0 fΓ0 f , Φ03 (T ) = Γ T0 fQ0 fΓ0 f .
And by (43),
β˙ 00 = (Φ
0
1M0−AT0 )β 00 − (GT −ΛaM)β 01
+Φ02Mα1+Q0η0,
β˙ 01 = (Φ
0
2
T
M0−FT0 )β 00 − (AT +FT − (Λ1+ΛT2 )M)β 01
+Φ03Mα1−Γ T0 Q0η0,
where
β 00 (T ) =−Q0 fη0 f , β 01 (T ) = Γ T0 fQ0 f η0 f .
Finally, we rewrite u∗0 as
u∗0(t) =−R−10 BT0 (Φ01X0+Φ02X+β 00 ).
Now we give the solution of Problem (P1). Denote
A=

A0−M0Λ01 0 F0−M0Λ02
G A F
G−MΛTa 0 A+F−M(Λ1+Λ2)
 ,
B=

0
B
0
 , f =−

M0α
0
0
0
Mα1
 ,
Q= [−Γ1, In,−Γ2]TQ[−Γ1, In,−Γ2],
Q f = [−Γ1 f , In,−Γ2 f ]TQ f [−Γ1 f , In,−Γ2 f ].
The dynamics can be given as
dX0
dX1
dX
= A

X0
X1
X
dt+(Bu1+ f )dt+

D0dW0
D1dW1
0
 .
By dynamic programming, we introduce the two ODEs:
P˙=−ATP−PA+PBR−1BTP−Q, (44)
S˙=−ATS+PBR−1BTS
+P

M0α
0
0
0
Mα1
+

−Γ T1
In
−Γ T2
Qη , (45)
where
P(T ) =Q f , S(T ) =−

−Γ T1 f
In
−Γ T2 f
Q f η f .
We uniquely solve P and S on [0,T ]. Denote
P=

Φ0, Φa, Φb
ΦTa , Φ1, Φ2
ΦTb , Φ
T
2 , Φ3
 , S=

β0
β1
β2
 ,
where Φ0, Φ1 and Φ3 are symmetric. By (44), we derive the
ODE system:
Φ˙0 = ΦaMΦ
T
a −GTΦTa −ΦaG−Γ T1 QΓ1
−(AT0 −Λ01M0)Φ0−Φ0(A0−M0Λ01 )
−(GT −ΛaM)ΦTb −Φb(G−MΛTa ),
Φ˙1 = Φ1MΦ1−ATΦ1−Φ1A−Q,
Φ˙2 =−ATΦ2−Φ1F−ΦTa (F0−M0Λ02 )
−Φ2(A+F−M(Λ1+Λ2))+Φ1MΦ2
+QΓ2,
Φ˙3 = Φ
T
2 MΦ2−FTΦ2−ΦT2 F
−(FT0 −Λ02
T
M0)Φb−ΦTb (F0−M0Λ02 )
−(AT +FT − (Λ1+ΛT2 )M)Φ3
−Φ3(A+F−M(Λ1+Λ2))−Γ T2 QΓ2,
Φ˙a =−ΦaA−GTΦ1− (AT0 −Λ01M0)Φa
−(GT −ΛaM)ΦT2 +ΦaMΦ1+Γ T1 Q,
Φ˙b =−Φ0(F0−M0Λ02 )−GTΦ2−ΦaF+ΦaMΦ2
−(AT0 −Λ01M0)Φb− (GT −ΛaM)Φ3
−Φb(A+F−M(Λ1+Λ2))−Γ T1 QΓ2,
where
Φ0(T ) = Γ
T
1 fQ fΓ1 f , Φ1(T ) = Q f , Φ2(T ) =−Q fΓ2 f ,
Φ3(T ) = Γ
T
2 fQ fΓ2 f , Φa(T ) =−Γ T1 fQ f ,
Φb(T ) = Γ
T
1 fQ fΓ2 f .
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Now by (45), we derive
β˙0 = (ΦaM−GT )β1− (AT0 −Λ01M0)β0
−(GT −ΛaM)β2+Φ0M0α00 +ΦbMα1−Γ T1 Qη ,
β˙1 = (Φ1M−AT )β1+ΦTa M0α00 +Φ2Mα1+Qη ,
β˙2 = (Φ
T
2 M−FT )β1− (FT0 −Λ02
T
M0)β0
−(AT +FT − (Λ1+ΛT2 )M)β2
+ΦTb M0α
0
0 +Φ3Mα1−Γ T2 Qη ,
where
β0(T ) = Γ
T
1 fQ f η f , β1(T ) =−Q fη f , β2(T ) = Γ T2 fQ fη f .
The optimal control law is given by
u∗1(t) =−R−1BT (ΦTa X0+Φ1X1+Φ2X+β1).
Theorem 9 We have
P0 =
[
Λ01 Λ
0
2
Λ02
T
Λ03
]
, S0 =
[
α00
α01
]
,
and
P=

Λ0, Λa, Λb
ΛTa , Λ1, Λ2
ΛTb , Λ
T
2 , Λ3
 , S=

α0
α1
α2
 .
Proof. We can directly show that
(Φ01 ,Φ
0
2 ,Φ
0
3 ,Φ0,Φ1,Φ2,Φ3,Φa,Φb)
is a solution of (31). Similarly, (β 00 ,β
0
1 ,β0,β1,β2) satisfies
the ODE of (α00 ,α
0
1 ,α0,α1,α2). Therefore, we obtain the
representation of (P0,P,S0,S). ✷
By Theorem 9, after appropriate arrangement the matrix
functions in the solution of (31) have the interpretation as
the solutions of two Riccati-like equations.
It is now clear that (u∗0,u
∗
1) agrees with (uˇ0, uˇi) given by (35)-
(36). Then we have the following interpretation on (uˇ0, uˇi)
within an infinite population of minor players. First, uˇ0 is
the best response with respect to X ; second, uˇi is the best re-
sponse with respect to (X ,x0, uˇ0); and finally, X is generated
by the infinite number of minor players applying their best
responses. This suggests a consistent mean field approxi-
mation, which is well known in the fixed point approach of
mean field games (Caines, Huang, and Malhame´, 2017). In
our mean field limit here, the consistent mean field approxi-
mation is a derived property. This is in contrast to the major
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Fig. 1. The numerical solution of (31) in Example 1
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Fig. 2. The numerical solution of (31) in Example 2
player model in (Huang, 2010; Carmona and Zhu, 2016),
where consistent mean field approximations are imposed as
a requirement at the beginning so that individual strategies
can be determined.
6 Numerical examples
We have seen that testing asymptotic solvability reduces
to checking the solution of (31) on [0,T ]. It is generally
infeasible to solve (31) analytically. Its numerical solution
provides a practical means to check asymptotic solvability.
Example 1 The parameters in (1)-(4) are given by A0 = 1,
B0 = 2, F0 = 0.5, A= 0.5, B= 1, F = 0.2, G= 0.4, Q0 = 1,
R0 = 0.5, Q= 2, R= 1, Γ0 = 0.8, Γ1 = 0.3, Γ2 = 0.5, Q0 f =
Q f = 0, and T = 12. We use ode45 of MatLab to numerically
solve (31) on [0,T ]; see Fig. 1. The existence of the solution
suggests asymptotic solvability holds.
Example 2 A0 = 0.3, B0 = 1, F0 = 0.2, A = 0.2, B = 1,
F = 1, G = −0.2, Q0 = 2, R0 = 1, Q = 1, R = 1, Γ0 =
0.8, Γ1 = 0.1, Γ2 = 1.2, Q0 f = Q f = 0, and T = 2.5. The
numerical solution of (31) has a finite escape time between
0.5 and 1 as shown in Fig. 2, suggesting no asymptotic
solvability.
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7 Concluding remarks
We study an asymptotic solvability problem for LQ Nash
games involving a major player and N minor players, where
N tends to infinity. We obtain the necessary and sufficient
condition of asymptotic solvability via a system of Riccati
ODEs and evaluate the equilibrium costs. The system of Ric-
cati ODEs has close relation with a limiting control model
of two players: the major player and a representative minor
player. For future work, it is of interest to generalize our
analysis to deal with leadership (Bensoussan et al, 2017),
noisy measurements (Firoozi and Caines, 2015), and control
constraints (Hu, Huang and Li, 2018).
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma A.1 Assume that (17) and (20) have a solution
(P0(t), · · · ,PN(t)) on [0,T ]. Then the following holds.
i) P0(t) has the representation
P0(t) =

Π 01 Π
0
2 Π
0
2 · · · Π 02
Π 02
T
Π 03 Π
0
4 · · · Π 04
Π 02
T
Π 04 Π
0
3 · · · Π 04
...
...
...
. . .
...
Π 02
T
Π 04 Π
0
4 · · · Π 03

,
where Π 01 (t), Π
0
3 (t) and Π
0
4 (t) are n× n symmetric matrix
functions. The matrix Π 04 appears for N
2−N times.
ii) P1(t) has the representation
P1(t) =

Π0 Πa Πb · · · Πb
ΠTa Π1 Π2 · · · Π2
ΠTb Π
T
2 Π3 · · · Π4
...
...
...
. . .
...
ΠTb Π
T
2 Π4 · · · Π3

where Π0(t), Π1(t), Π3(t) and Π4(t) are n× n symmetric
matrix functions. The matrix Π4 appears for (N−1)(N−2)
times.
iii) For i> 1, Pi(t) = J
T
2,i+1P1(t)J2,i+1.
Proof. i) For 0 ≤ l ≤ N, denote Pl = (P jkl )1≤ j,k≤N+1,
where P
jk
l is an n × n matrix. Let Pˆl = JT23PlJ23. By
the method in (Huang and Zhou, 2018b, Lemma A.1)
and elementary matrix computations, we can verify that
(Pˆ0, Pˆ2,Pˆ1,Pˆ3, · · · , PˆN) satisfies (17) and (20). Hence,
Pˆ0 = P0, Pˆ2 = P1, Pˆ1 = P2, Pˆk = Pk, k ≥ 3.
Then P2 = J
T
23P1J23 and P0 = J
T
23P0J23, and we obtain
P 220 = P
33
0 , P
12
0 = P
13
0 .
Taking Jk,k+1, k≥ 3 in place of J23 and following the method
in (Huang and Zhou, 2018b), we obtain the representation
of P0.
ii) Now denote Pˆl = J
T
34PlJ34, and we can verify that
(Pˆ0,Pˆ1,Pˆ3,Pˆ2, Pˆ4, · · · , PˆN)
is a solution of (17) and (20). Hence,
Pˆ1 = P1, Pˆ3 = P2, Pˆ2 = P3.
This yieldsP 131 =P
14
1 ,P
23
1 =P
24
1 andP
33
1 =P
44
1 . In addi-
tion, P 431 =P
34
1 . Since P1 is symmetric, (P
43
1 )
T =P 341 . So
P 341 is symmetric. Similarly, by the relation J
T
45P1J45 =P1,
we obtain P 341 = P
35
1 . Now, repeatedly using the relation
JTk,k+1P1Jk,k+1 = P1 for all k≥ 3, we obtain the representa-
tion of P1. Note that Π4 is symmetric.
iii) This equality can be shown as in the case i = 2 in the
proof of part i). ✷
Proof of Theorem 2: By Lemma A.1, we have
Π˙ 01 (t) = Π
0
1M0Π
0
1 +NΠ
0
2MΠ
T
a +NΠaMΠ
0
2
T
− (Π 01A0+AT0 Π 01 )
−N(Π 02G+GTΠ 02
T
)−Q0,
Π 01 (T ) = Q0 f , (A.1)
and
Π˙ 02 (t) = Π
0
1M0Π
0
2 +Π
0
2MΠ1+ΠaMΠ
0
3
+(N− 1)(Π 02MΠ2+ΠaMΠ 04 )
− (Π 01 F0N +Π 02F+Π 02A)
− (AT0 Π 02 +GTΠ 03 +(N− 1)GTΠ 04 )+Q0Γ0N ,
Π 02 (T ) =−Q0 f Γ0 fN , (A.2)
and
Π˙ 03 (t) = Π
0
2
T
M0Π
0
2 +Π
0
3MΠ1+Π1MΠ
0
3
+(N− 1)(Π 04MΠ2+ΠT2 MΠ 04 )
− 1
N
(Π 02
T
F0+F
T
0 Π
0
2 )
− (1− 1
N
)(Π 04F+F
TΠ 04 )
−
(
Π 03 (A+
F
N
)+ (AT + F
T
N
)Π 03
)
− Γ T0
N
Q0
Γ0
N
,
Π 03 (T ) =
Γ T0 f
N
Q0 f
Γ0 f
N
, (A.3)
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and
Π˙ 04 (t) = Π
0
2
T
M0Π
0
2 +Π
0
4MΠ1+Π1MΠ
0
4
+Π 03MΠ2+Π
T
2 MΠ
0
3
+(N− 2)(Π 04MΠ2+ΠT2 MΠ 04 )
− 1
N
(Π 02
T
F0+F
T
0 Π
0
2 )− 1N (Π 03F+FTΠ 03 )
−
(
Π 04 (A+
N−1
N
F)+ (AT + N−1
N
FT )Π 04
)
− Γ T0
N
Q0
Γ0
N
,
Π 04 (T ) =
Γ T0 f
N
Q0 f
Γ0 f
N
. (A.4)
We have Π 03 (T ) = Π
0
4 (T ), and
Π˙ 03 (t)− Π˙ 04 (t) =(Π 03 −Π 04 )(MΠ1−MΠ2−A)
+ (Π1M−ΠT2 M−AT )(Π 03 −Π 04 ).
It follows that
Π 03 (t) = Π
0
4 (t) ∀t ∈ [0,T ]. (A.5)
By Lemma A.1, we have
Π˙0(t) = ΠaMΠ
T
a +Π0M0Π
0
1 +Π
0
1M0Π0
− (Π0A0+AT0 Π0)− (ΠaG+GTΠTa )
− (N− 1)(ΠbG+GTΠTb )
+ (N− 1)(ΠbMΠTa +ΠaMΠTb )
−Γ T1 QΓ1,
Π0(T ) = Γ
T
1 fQ fΓ1 f , (A.6)
and
Π˙1(t) = Π1MΠ1+Π
T
a M0Π
0
2 +Π
0
2
T
M0Πa
+(N− 1)(Π2MΠ2+ΠT2 MΠT2 )
− 1
N
(ΠTa F0+F
T
0 Πa)
−
(
Π1(A+
F
N
)+ (AT + F
T
N
)Π1
)
− (1− 1
N
)(Π2F+F
TΠT2 )
− (I− Γ T2
N
)Q(I− Γ2
N
),
Π1(T ) = (I− Γ
T
2 f
N
)Q f (I− Γ2 fN ), (A.7)
and
Π˙2(t) = Π
T
a M0Π
0
2 +Π
0
2
T
M0Πb
+Π1MΠ2+Π2MΠ1+Π
T
2 MΠ3
+(N− 2)(Π2MΠ2+ΠT2 MΠ4)
− 1
N
(ΠTa F0+F
T
0 Πb)
−
(
Π2(A+
N−1
N
F)+ (AT + F
T
N
)Π2
)
− (1− 2
N
)FTΠ4− 1N (Π1F+FTΠ3)
+ (I− Γ T2
N
)QΓ2
N
,
Π2(T ) =−(I−
Γ T2 f
N
)Q f
Γ2 f
N
, (A.8)
and
Π˙3(t) = Π
T
b M0Π
0
2 +Π
0
2
T
M0Πb
+ΠT2 MΠ2+Π3MΠ1+Π1MΠ3
+(N− 2)(Π4MΠ2+ΠT2 MΠ4)
− 1
N
(ΠTb F0+F
T
0 Πb+Π
T
2 F+F
TΠ2)
−
(
Π3(A+
F
N
)+ (AT + F
T
N
)Π3
)
− (1− 2
N
)(Π4F+F
TΠ4)− Γ
T
2
N
Q
Γ2
N
,
Π3(T ) =
Γ T2 f
N
Q f
Γ2 f
N
, (A.9)
and
Π˙4(t) = Π
T
b M0Π
0
2 +Π
0
2
T
M0Πb+Π
T
2 MΠ2+Π3MΠ2
+ΠT2 MΠ3+Π4MΠ1+Π1MΠ4
+(N− 3)(Π4MΠ2+ΠT2 MΠ4)
− 1
N
(ΠTb F0+F
T
0 Πb)
−
(
Π4(A+
N−2
N
F)+ (AT + N−2
N
FT )Π4
)
− 1
N
(ΠT2 F+F
TΠ2+Π3F+F
TΠ3)− Γ
T
2
N
Q
Γ2
N
,
Π4(T ) =
Γ T2 f
N
Q f
Γ2 f
N
, (A.10)
and
Π˙a(t) = Π0M0Π
0
2 +Π
0
1M0Πa+ΠaMΠ1
+(N− 1)(ΠbMΠ2+ΠaMΠT2 )
−
(
Π0
F0
N
+Πa(A+
F
N
)+ (N− 1)Πb FN
)
− (AT0 Πa+GTΠ1+(N− 1)GTΠT2 )
+Γ T1 Q(I− Γ2N ),
Πa(T ) =−Γ T1 fQ f (I− Γ2 fN ), (A.11)
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and
Π˙b(t) = Π0M0Π
0
2 +Π
0
1M0Πb+ΠbMΠ1
+ΠaMΠ2+ΠaMΠ3
+(N− 2)(ΠbMΠ2+ΠaMΠ4)
−
(
Π0
F0
N
+Πa
F
N
+ΠbA+(N− 1)Πb FN
)
− (AT0 Πb+GTΠ2+GTΠ3+(N− 2)GTΠ4)
−Γ T1 QΓ2N ,
Πb(T ) = Γ
T
1 fQ f
Γ2 f
N
. (A.12)
We have Π3(T ) = Π4(T ), and
Π˙3(t)− Π˙4(t) =(Π3−Π4)(MΠ1−MΠ2−A)
+ (Π1M−ΠT2 M−AT )(Π3−Π4).
Therefore, Π3(t) = Π4(t) for all t ∈ [0,T ]. This completes
the proof. ✷
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 4
Step 1. By (A.1), (A.3) and (A.5), we determine
Λ˙0N1 = Λ
0N
1 M0Λ
0N
1 +Λ
0N
2 MΛ
N
a
T
+ΛNa M(Λ
0N
2 )
T
− (Λ0N1 A0+AT0Λ0N1 )
− (Λ0N2 G+GT (Λ0N2 )T )−Q0, (B.1)
Λ˙0N2 = Λ
0N
1 M0Λ
0N
2 +Λ
0N
2 (MΛ
N
1 +MΛ
N
2 −F−A)
−AT0Λ0N2 −Λ0N1 F0+(ΛNa M−GT )Λ0N3
+Q0Γ0+ g
0
2(1/N,Λ
0N
2 ,Λ
N
2 ), (B.2)
Λ˙0N3 = (Λ
0N
2 )
TM0Λ
0N
2 +Λ
0N
3 MΛ
N
1 +Λ
N
1 MΛ
0N
3 − (Λ0N2 )TF0
−FT0 Λ0N2 −Λ0N3 (A+F)− (AT +FT )Λ0N3
+Λ0N3 MΛ
N
2 +Λ
N
2
T
MΛ0N3
−Γ T0 Q0Γ0+ g03(1/N,Λ0N3 ,ΛN2 ), (B.3)
where Λ0N1 (T ) = Q0 f , Λ
0N
2 (T ) = −Q0 fΓ0 f , Λ0N3 (T ) =
Γ T0 fQ0 fΓ0 f , and
g02(1/N,Λ
0N
2 ,Λ
N
2 ) =−(1/N)(Λ0N2 MΛN2 ).
For reasons of space, the expression of g03 is not displayed.
We further obtain
Λ˙N0 = Λ
N
a MΛ
N
a
T
+ΛN0 M0Λ
0N
1 +Λ
0N
1 M0Λ
N
0
−ΛN0 A0−AT0ΛN0 − (ΛNa +ΛNb )G−GT (ΛNa +ΛNb )T
+ΛNb MΛ
N
a
T
+ΛNa MΛ
N
b
T
−Γ T1 QΓ1+ g0(1/N,ΛNa ,ΛNb ), (B.4)
ΛN0 (T ) = Γ
T
1 fQ fΓ1 f ,
Λ˙N1 = Λ
N
1 MΛ
N
1 −ΛN1 A−ATΛN1 −Q
+ g1(1/N,Λ
0N
2 ,Λ
N
1 ,Λ
N
2 ,Λ
N
a ), (B.5)
ΛN1 (T ) = (I−
Γ T2 f
N
)Q f (I− Γ2 fN ),
Λ˙N2 = Λ
N
a
T
(M0Λ
0N
2 −F0)+ΛN1 MΛN2 +ΛN2 MΛN1
−ΛN2 (A+F)−ATΛN2 −ΛN1 F+ΛN2 MΛN2
+QΓ2+ g2(1/N,Λ
0N
2 ,Λ
N
2 ,Λ
N
3 ,Λ
N
b ), (B.6)
ΛN2 (T ) =−(I−
Γ T2 f
N
)Q fΓ2 f ,
Λ˙N3 = Λ
N
b
T
M0Λ
0N
2 +(Λ
0N
2 )
TM0Λ
N
b +Λ
N
2
T
MΛN2
+ΛN3 MΛ
N
1 +Λ
N
1 MΛ
N
3 +(Λ
N
3 MΛ
N
2 +Λ
N
2
T
MΛN3 )
−ΛNb
T
F0−FT0 ΛNb −ΛN2
T
F−FTΛN2
−ΛN3 (A+F)− (AT +FT )ΛN3 −Γ T2 QΓ2
+ g3(1/N,Λ
N
2 ,Λ
N
3 ), (B.7)
ΛN3 (T ) = Γ
T
2 fQ fΓ2 f ,
Λ˙Na = Λ
0N
1 M0Λ
N
a +Λ
N
a MΛ
N
1 +Λ
N
a MΛ
N
2
T
−ΛNa A−AT0ΛNa −GT (ΛN1 +ΛN2
T
)
+Γ T1 Q+ ga(1/N,Λ
0N
2 ,Λ
N
0 ,Λ
N
2 ,Λ
N
a ,Λ
N
b ), (B.8)
ΛNa (T ) =−Γ T1 fQ f (I− Γ2 fN ),
Λ˙Nb = Λ
N
0 M0Λ
0N
2 +Λ
0N
1 M0Λ
N
b +Λ
N
b MΛ
N
1 +Λ
N
a MΛ
N
2
+ΛNb MΛ
N
2 +Λ
N
a MΛ
N
3 −ΛN0 F0−ΛNa F
−ΛNb (A+F)−AT0ΛNb −GT (ΛN2 +ΛN3 )
−Γ T1 QΓ2+ gb(1/N,ΛN2 ,ΛN3 ,ΛNa ,ΛNb ), (B.9)
ΛNb (T ) = Γ
T
1 fQ fΓ2 f ,
where g0, · · · ,gb are not displayed and are compactly of
O(1/N).
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Denote ξN =(Λ0N1 ,Λ
0N
2 , · · · ,ΛNb ) for (30), andwe view each
of g02, g
0
3, g0, g1, g2, g3, ga, gb as a function of ξ
N with
parameter 1/N. They are all compactly ofO(1/N). For some
C > 0, we further have
|(Λ0N1 (T )−Λ01 (T ),Λ0N2 (T )−Λ02 (T ), . . . ,ΛNb (T )−Λb(T ))|
≤C/N.
Subsequently, we view the ODE system (B.1)-(B.9) as a
slightly perturbed form of (31). The remaining proof is sim-
ilar to that of (Huang and Zhou, 2018b, Theorem 5) and
we only give its sketch. If asymptotic solvability holds, we
solve (B.1)-(B.9) for all sufficiently large N. By taking some
increasing subsequence of population sizes N1 < N2 < · · · ,
we can ensure that as k→ ∞, their solutions {ξNk(t),k =
1,2, · · ·} have a limit as a vector function on [0,T ] which
satisfies the limit ODE (31) on [0,T ]. Conversely, if (31) has
a solution on [0,T ], there exists N0 > 0 such that (B.1)-(B.9)
has a solution on [0,T ] for all N ≥ N0; all these solutions
are uniformly bounded. Accordingly we obtain (P0, . . . ,PN)
to satisfy (27) for all N ≥ N0. So asymptotic solvability
holds. ✷
Appendix C
In view of (18) and (21), by Proposition 5 we have
θ˙ 00 (t) =−AT0 θ 00 −NGTθ 01 +Π 01M0θ 00 +NΠaMθ 01
+NΠ 02Mθ1+Q0η0,
θ˙ 01 (t) =−
FT0
N
θ 00 −ATθ 01 −FTθ 01 +Π 02
T
M0θ
0
0 +Π1Mθ
0
1
+(N− 1)ΠT2 Mθ 01 +NΠ 03Mθ1−
Γ T0
N
Q0η0,
(C.1)
where
θ 00 (T ) =−Q0 fη0 f , θ 01 (T ) =
Γ T0 f
N
Q0 fη0 f ,
and
θ˙0(t) =−AT0 θ0−GTθ1− (N− 1)GTθ2+Π 01M0θ0
+Π0M0θ
0
0 +ΠaMθ1+(N− 1)ΠaMθ2
+(N− 1)ΠbMθ1−Γ T1 Qη ,
θ˙1(t) =−F
T
0
N
θ0− (AT + FTN )θ1− (N− 1)F
T
N
θ2+Π
0
2
T
M0θ0
+ΠTa M0θ
0
0 +Π1Mθ1+(N− 1)ΠT2 Mθ2
+(N− 1)Π2Mθ1+(I− Γ
T
2
N
)Qη ,
θ˙2(t) =−F
T
0
N
θ0− FTN θ1−ATθ2− (N− 1)F
T
N
θ2+Π
0
2
T
M0θ0
+ΠTb M0θ
0
0 +Π
T
2 Mθ1+Π1Mθ2+(N− 2)ΠT2 Mθ2
+(N− 1)Π3Mθ1− Γ
T
2
N
Qη ,
(C.2)
whereθ0(T ) = Γ T1 fQ f η f , θ1(T ) =−(I−
Γ T2 f
N
)Q fη f ,
θ2(T ) =
Γ T2 f
N
Q fη f .
By (C.1), we have the relation
α˙0N0 = (Λ
0N
1 M0−AT0 )α0N0 +(ΛNa M−GT )α0N1
+Λ0N2 Mα
N
1 +Q0η0,
α˙0N1 = ((Λ
0N
2 )
TM0−FT0 )α0N0
+(ΛN1 M+Λ
N
2
T
M−AT −FT )α0N1
+Λ0N3 Mα
N
1 −Γ T0 Q0η0+ h01(1/N,α0N1 ,ΛN2 ),
where α0N0 (T ) = −Q0 fη0 f , α0N1 (T ) = Γ T0 fQ0 fη0 f , and
h01(1/N,α
0N
1 ,Λ
N
2 ) =− 1NΛN2
T
α0N1 . By (C.2), we have
α˙N0 = (Λ
0N
1 M0−AT0 )αN0 +((ΛNa +ΛNb )M−GT )αN1
+(ΛNa M−GT )αN2 +ΛN0 M0α0N0 −Γ T1 Qη
+ h0(1/N,α
N
1 ,α
N
2 ,Λ
N
a ,Λ
N
b ),
α˙N1 = Λ
N
a
T
M0α
0N
0 −ATαN1 +ΛN1 MαN1 +ΛN2 MαN1 +Qη
+ h1(α
0N
1 ,α
N
0 ,α
N
1 ,α
N
2 ,Λ
0N
2 ,Λ
N
2 ,Λ
N
a ),
α˙N2 = ((Λ
0N
2 )
TM0−FT0 )αN0 +((ΛN3 +ΛN2
T
)M−FT )αN1
+((ΛN1 +Λ
N
2
T
)M−AT −FT )αN2 +ΛNb
T
M0α
0
0
N
−Γ T2 Qη + h2(αN1 ,αN2 ,ΛN2 ,ΛN3 ),
where the terminal condition is
αN0 (T ) = Γ
T
1 fQ fη f , α
N
1 (T ) =−(I−
Γ T2 f
N
)Q f η f ,
αN2 (T ) = Γ
T
2 fQ fη f ,
and h0, h1, h2 are compactly of O(1/N).
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